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and
Australian National University
ABSTRACT
As ‘Europe’ becomes more diverse, the countries that were formerly part of the
USSR face new choices. One of the most fundamental is whether they identify with
the economic and military institutions of the ‘West’, such as NATO and the European
Union, or with the Commonwealth of Independent States and other forms of
association with the Slavic ‘East’. We examine these choices in each of three
societies—Belarus, Russia and Ukraine—on the basis of national surveys conducted
between 2000 and 2008. Across the three, ‘Eastern’ orientations have more popular
support than ‘Western’ ones, but Ukrainian opinion is more sharply polarised than
opinion in the other two countries. There is more support for a ‘Slavic choice’ in
Russia than in either of the other two countries, and particularly large numbers there
who regret the demise of the USSR; but opinion on such matters is moderate rather
than fundamentalist and does not necessarily exclude a closer relationship with the
European Union and NATO.
INTRODUCTION
The Cold War defined two rival spheres of influence. No less important, it defined
two sets of identities. Whether or not they shared its objectives, citizens of the
communist-ruled countries to the east were part of a larger system of values,
alliances and institutions. Their societies defined themselves as a ‘socialist
community’, in which a distinctive way of life—collectivist and materialist—had
supposedly been consolidated. Their economies and political systems were
interconnected; they shared the same external borders; and they defended them
through the same military alliance. If they went on a foreign holiday, it would be to
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the Black Sea rather than the Mediterranean; if they drank wine, it was likely to be
Bulgarian or Hungarian; if they read a book, it was more likely to be Gorky than
Pasternak or Solzhenitsyn (and least of all the Bible).
These impressions are not misleading. More than two-thirds of the USSR’s
foreign trade in the late 1980s, for instance, was with other communist-ruled
countries; foreign radio broadcasts were still being jammed; and although tourism
was increasing, more than 90% of the Soviet citizens who went abroad at this time
visited other member countries of the Eastern bloc.1
With the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, all these distinctions began to
lose their earlier significance. Across the region, countries divided—the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia—or reunited (the two Germanys). And they began to
exercise their newly acquired sovereignty to form different patterns of association.
Some of them joined the European Union, or even NATO. Others joined the
Commonwealth of Independent States, established at the end of 1991 as the USSR
itself collapsed, and some of them also became members of a series of multilateral
associations that extended across the post-Soviet region, including a Eurasian
Economic Community, a Collective Security Treaty Organisation and a Single
Economic Space.2 The closest association of all was the ‘Community’ and then far-
reaching ‘Union’ between Russia and Belarus; but Russia joined associations with
other states that had not been part of the USSR, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation; and other former Soviet republics joined associations of which Russia
was not a member, such as GUAM.3 Issues of international reorientation were
particularly acute for the ‘lands in between’, that is, the Slavic states that had been
part of the USSR but which were also geographically European, and which found
themselves torn between their former Soviet associations—human as well as
economic and military—and the invitation to take a fuller part in economic and
military institutions of the West.
Perhaps the most fundamental of these reorientations was in relation to ‘Europe’.
Geography hardly resolved the matter: boundaries had been drawn in different places
at different times,4 and there were countries that straddled the geographical divide,
including Russia and Kazakhstan. Perhaps it was better to think of ‘civilisations’?
But although Huntington had emphasised the Christian–Islamic dichotomy more
than any other, he also differentiated between the countries of the ‘West’ (which were
marked out by their individualism, separation of church and state, rule of law and
1Fewer than 7% visited any of the developed capitalist countries. See Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR
v 1987g. (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1988), 602, 683.
2The treaty creating the Eurasian Economic Community was signed in October 2000 by Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, and it came into force on 30 May 2001. Further
information is available at: http://www.photius.com/eaec/ (10 October 2008). The Collective Security
Treaty Organisation was established on 18 September 2003, following agreement by heads of the states
who had signed the Treaty on Collective Security in May 1992 (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Russia and Tajikistan) to transform that treaty into an international, regional
organisation. Further information on the CSTO is available at: http://www.cagateway.org/
en/topics/23/84/ (17 October 2008). The Single Economic Space was established in September 2003
during a summit of the Commonwealth of Independent states at Yalta; those states involved are Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine. 
3The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a permanent, intergovernmental, international
organisation established in June 2001 between China, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Russia,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Further information is available at: http://www.sectsco.org/html/00026.html
(17 October 2008). GUAM, an association concerned with democracy and economic development, was
established in 1997 as a consultative forum between four original members: Georgia, Ukraine,
Azerbaijan and Moldova. 
4Larry Wolff, Inventing Eastern Europe: the map of civilization on the mind of the Enlightenment
(Stanford, 1994). 
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market economy) and a ‘Slavic-Orthodox’ civilisation in the east, also Christian, but
one in which church and state were more closely related and foreign domination had
lasted much longer. Differences of this kind, Huntington suggested, were the
‘product of centuries’, and ‘far more fundamental than differences among political
ideologies and political regimes’. Belarus and Ukraine were divided by this
cleavage; Russia was a ‘torn country’, wholly Orthodox but divided between two
continents, and whether it was really ‘European’ or ‘Asiatic’ had been debated since
at least the time of Pushkin’s exchanges with Chadaev in the early nineteenth
century.5
In this paper, we seek to advance the discussion of these large and complex issues
by focusing on self-perceptions in each of the three countries under consideration—
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine—in the spirit of the study of foreign relations that has
become known as ‘constructivism’. The aim, as Hopf has put it, is not only to show
how a 
state’s identities are produced in interactions with other states, but also how its
identities are being produced in interaction with its own society and the many
identities and discourses that constitute that society.6
We look first of all at the ‘Western’ choice that faces these societies, then at the
‘Slavic’ choice and its rather different bases of support; we move on in our final
section to consider the distribution of support for these alternative options across the
three societies, and then examine the wider implications of these patterns. We draw
our evidence from national representative surveys conducted between 2000 and
2008, which are themselves part of a larger and still continuing inquiry that
incorporates focus groups and elite interviews as well as printed sources.7 Full details
of the surveys are provided in our appendix.
LOOKING ‘WEST’
We begin our exploration of the ‘Western’choice by examining the extent to which the
mass public in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia define their own identity as at least partly
‘European’.8 Our results are set out in Table 1; several conclusions emerge reasonably
5Samuel Huntington, ‘The clash of civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs 72 (3) (Summer, 1993), 22–49:
43–4. 
6Ted Hopf, Social construction of international politics (Ithaca, New York and London, 2002), 294.
7See particularly Roy Allison, Margot Light and Stephen White, Putin’s Russia and the enlarged
Europe (Oxford, 2006). Full details of the project are available at: www.lbss.gla.ac.uk/politics/inclusion
withoutmembership; a full list of publications may be consulted at http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/
ESRCInfoCentre/AdvancedSearchPage3.aspx (17 October 2008).
8As Lars-Erick Cederman has noted, Europe ‘belongs to the most elusive and contested entities in
today’s international system’, see Cederman (ed.), Constructing Europe’s identity: the external
dimension (Boulder, CO and London, 2001), 1. According to Timothy Baycroft, ‘European identity’,
in Gary Taylor and Steve Spencer (eds), Social identities: multidisciplinary approaches (London,
2004), 145–61: 154, much of the literature has been based on the somewhat problematic evidence of
the Eurobarometer, which embodies the assumptions of the European Commission that finances it. The
recent literature includes, for instance, Richard K. Herrmann, Thomas Risse and Marilynn B. Brewer,
Transnational identities: becoming European in the EU (Lanham, MD, 2004); Laurie Buonanno and
Ann Deakin, ‘European identity’, in Niall Nugent (ed.), European Union enlargement (Basingstoke,
2004), 88–102; and Michael Bruter, Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass European identity
(London, 2005). We have sought to contribute ourselves to this discussion, particularly in Stephen
White, Ian McAllister, Margot Light and John Löwenhardt, ‘A European or a Slavic choice? Foreign
policy and public attitudes in post-Soviet Europe’, Europe-Asia Studies 54 (2) (March, 2002), 181–202;
Roy Allison, Stephen White and Margot Light, ‘Belarus between East and West’, Journal of Communist
Studies and Transition Politics 21 (4) (December, 2005), 487–511; Stephen White, Julia Korosteleva
and Roy Allison, ‘NATO: the view from the East’, European Security 15 (2) (June, 2006), 165–90;
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clearly. First of all, in every case European self-identity has been declining, rather than
increasing, as the European Union extends its own boundaries: the greatest fall in
respondents’ self-identification as Europeans has been in Russia, at least until 2005, but
the same trends are apparent in the other two countries. In 2000 about half our Russian
and Belarusian respondents thought they were at least to some extent ‘European’, and
more than a third of our Ukrainians thought the same; six or seven years later, the
proportions were lower in every case, less strikingly in Belarus (which is consistently
the most ‘European’ in its responses), but here too the proportion who ‘seldom’ or
‘never’ thought of themselves as Europeans had increased considerably. Ukrainian
attitudes were relatively stable, but Russians were still more likely to have ceased to
think of themselves as at least partly ‘European’, and they were the most likely
‘seldom’or ‘never’ to do so. Those who claimed they ‘never’ felt European were about
half of all our Ukrainian and Russian respondents in 2007 and 2008, respectively. In
every case, except Belarus, this was the median response; in Belarus, in 2006, the
largest single group of respondents ‘seldom’ thought of themselves as Europeans.
Identities are obviously multiple and polyvalent, and no single question is likely
to yield an unambiguous set of responses. Accordingly, we asked a related set of
questions using a wording modelled on the Eurobarometer, which allowed a wider
range of responses and provided results that could, in principle, be compared across
the entire continent. Our results are set out in Table 2. Again, the main conclusions
are clear. Overwhelmingly, in each case, our respondents felt their first identity was
as a citizen of that country. Almost to the same extent, our respondents felt they were
citizens of their local area or settlement; regional identities were also popular.
Relatively few thought of their identity as European in the first or even the second
place. Belarusians, who had been somewhat more likely to think of themselves as
‘Europeans’ in 2000, were also the most likely to identify themselves with a
European identity, and the numbers were edging upwards. But even in Belarus a
European identity came a long way behind an identity that was related to the state
itself, or the locality, or the region in which their place of residence was located; in
Russia a European identity was still less common, even in the parts of the country
that are geographically European, and rather fewer conceived of themselves in this
way than as Soviet citizens a decade or more after the demise of the USSR itself.
Julia Korosteleva and Stephen White, ‘Feeling European: the view from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine’,
Contemporary Politics 12 (2) (June, 2006) 193–208; and Stephen White, Julia Korosteleva and Ian
McAllister, ‘A wider Europe? The view from Russia, Belarus and Ukraine’, Journal of Common Market
Studies 46 (2) (March, 2008), 219–41.
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Table 1. European self-identity, 2000–8
Belarus Ukraine Russia
2000 2004 2006 2000 2004 2006 2007 2000 2005 2008
To a significant
extent 16 9 11 8 6 6 5 18 7 8
To some extent 34 25 29 26 20 22 23 34 18 19
Seldom/Never 38 54 54 57 62 66 64 47 68 63
(Ns) 1090 1599 1000 1590 2000 1600 1200 1940 2000 2000
Source: authors’ surveys (see appendix). Question wording was ‘Do you think of yourself as a
European?’; in 2000 the Belarusian and Ukrainian responses were ‘often’, ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’.
Figures show rounded percentages; ‘don’t knows’ and ‘no answers’ account for residuals.
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Across the countries of the European Union, and indeed among those that have
no immediate prospect of membership, levels of ‘European’ identification are
considerably higher. The Eurobarometer routinely asks if respondents think of
themselves as nationals of their own country, as Europeans, or as nationals of their
own country and also Europeans. According to the exercise that was fielded during
the period of our surveys, 55% across all the EU member countries thought they had
at least a partly European identity, and 42% responded that they had only a national
identity. Our own figures suggested a primary or secondary European identity in
Belarus, Ukraine and Russia that was nowhere more than 20%, and a primary or
secondary national identity that was nowhere less than 68%. This compared with a
wholly or partly European identity that, among established EU member states, was
nowhere less than 32% (in the United Kingdom), and among 2004 EU entrants
nowhere less than 49% (in the Czech Republic; see Fig. 1). Levels of European
identity in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia are not simply below those for all current and
prospective EU member nations, defined on this basis: they are also below those for
Turkey, a largely Asian country with no immediate prospect of EU admission.9
We also asked about support for EU membership, and for NATO membership (in
all cases, for the moment, a hypothetical question). As with ‘Europeanness’, support
has been falling for European Union membership, and in all three countries. But it
remains, on balance, a popular option, with many more supporters than opponents.
Many more were either indifferent to the idea of EU membership or found it difficult
to formulate a view; relatively small numbers (except in Ukraine in 2006, for reasons
that may be connected with the EU’s intervention into its domestic politics following
its contested elections) were strongly opposed. As we might have expected, support
for EU membership is closely related to ‘Europeanness’: those who thought of
themselves as ‘to a significant extent European’ were more than three times as likely
to be strongly in favour of EU membership as others, taking the Ukrainian figures
9These figures are drawn from the Eurobarometer 64 (2006), 41–3, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb64/eb64_en.htmt, (7 April 2008). Bulgaria and Romania, which became
EU members in 2007, reported figures of 47 and 59%, respectively; in Croatia, which remains outside
the EU, the corresponding figure was 64%.
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Table 2. European vs. Other self-identities, 2004–8
Belarus Ukraine Russia
2004 2006 2004 2006 2007 2005 2008
European 16 20 10 12 11 8 11
Eurasian 2 3 2 2 1 3 4
Soviet citizen 10 12 11 9 11 13 14
Citizen of own
country 72 85 69 68 69 76 70
Citizen of own
region 18 25 27 33 31 29 36
From own
settlement 65 50 69 64 62 69 64
(Ns) 1599 1000 2000 1600 1200 2000 2000
Source: as Table 1. Question wording was ‘Which of the following do you think of yourself to be first
of all? And secondly?’ Figures show all who gave a corresponding response as their first or second
choice, in rounded percentages; other choices and those who failed to respond account for residuals.
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for 2007 as an example. Respondents who had expressed a significant European
identity were more likely to be able to identify the EU correctly, given a list of real
and imaginary international organisations, and to locate its headquarters. Most
strikingly of all, they were four or five times as likely as others to take a positive
view of the EU and of its aims and activities; and those who took a positive view of
the EU’s aims and activities were in turn four or five times more likely to support
the principle of membership.
Support for NATO membership is predictably much lower, and has been declining
further (Table 4). Indeed, opposition is nowhere stronger, across the three countries,
than in Ukraine, the only one of the countries under study in which the matter is
under active discussion and in which the views of the public will, in principle, be
decisive (on other evidence support for NATO membership has been falling steadily
since at least 2000, when the question first began to be asked).10 Based on our
experience in piloting the questionnaire, we included an explicitly ‘neutral’ response,
and this attracted the support of a plurality in Belarus and in Russia (in 2008, when
10N. Panina, Ukraïnsk’e suspil’stvo 1992–2006: sotsiologichnii monitoring (Ukraïni, 2006), 17.
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Luxemburg
2004 entry
EU25
2007 entry
Ireland
UK Turkey
Belarus
Russia
Ukraine
72
57
55
53 53
32
29
11
7
5
Percent feeling European, c. 2006
Figure 1. Feeling European, 2006–8
Source: derived from Table 1 and Eurobarometer 64 (2006), 41–3; figures show those declaring a
primary or secondary European identity.
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this option was not included, there was a substantial increase in ‘don’t know’s).
Substantial numbers, in every case, found it difficult to formulate a view. Support for
NATO membership, as we might have expected, was closely associated with other
views of the alliance. Supporters of NATO membership, for instance, were able to
identify it more readily when they were given a list of real or imaginary international
organisations, and they were more likely to see the alliance as a means of
strengthening international security, although there were a few respondents who saw
it as a ‘base for Western expansion’ but all the same wished to join.
LOOKING ‘EAST’
For the ‘lands in between’, however, there is more than a Western choice: there is
also an ‘Eastern’ choice, based on a primary identification with their opportunity to
associate more closely with their Slavic neighbours. This is an association, as we
saw at the outset, that rests on a much broader foundation than these countries’
former membership of the USSR. It reflects a common history, and language,
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Table 3. Support for EU Membership, 2000–8
Belarus Ukraine Russia
2000 2004 2006 2000 2004 2006 2007 2005 2008
Strongly support 23 26 17 23 20 17 18 19 13
Somewhat support 32 34 30 34 35 30 36 37 20
Somewhat oppose 11 8 18 7 11 18 15 12 8
Strongly oppose 5 3 8 4 6 17 8 7 4
Don’t know/
No answer 29 29 27 32 28 19 24 25 56
(Ns) 1090 1599 1000 1590 2000 1600 1200 2000 2000
Source: as Table 1; rounded percentages.
Table 4. Support for NATO Membership, 2004–8
Belarus Ukraine Russia
2004 2006 2004 2006 2007 2005 2008
Strongly support 5 5 5 4 4 5 4
Somewhat support 17 7 18 13 15 17 18
Neutral 29 31 28 19 20 34 –
Somewhat oppose 15 25 16 28 26 18 25
Strongly oppose 6 8 8 20 19 6 19
Don’t know/
No answer 27 28 26 16 16 21 34
(Ns) 1599 1000 2000 1600 1200 2000 2000
Source: as Table 1; rounded percentages.
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religious and other cultural affinities that have been little affected by the demise of
the USSR. It is reflected in the audience for Russian-language media in the other
two countries, particularly in Belarus (where three times as many watch Russian
television channels as Belarusian ones).11 Furthermore, it is reflected in the flow of
foreign trade, which is itself a reflection of the fact that the Soviet economy was an
integrated economic complex, with a network of road, rail and air communication
that was centred on Moscow. More than half (55%) of all Belarusian foreign trade,
for instance, is with other CIS countries, and 47% is with Russia alone.12 Russia, as
we have seen, is also Ukraine’s largest trade partner, and the country that provides
by far its largest numbers of foreign visitors.
An ‘Eastern’ choice, however, reflects much more than economics: it also
reflects the extent to which the Slavic and former Soviet republics were, and still
continue to represent, a human community, with lengthy common frontiers, a
common language, huge numbers of border crossings in both directions and family
associations of all kinds. We tapped these interpersonal relations in several ways.
We asked, for instance, if our Ukrainian respondents had close relatives living in
Russia. Almost half (47%) had one or several, and nearly a quarter (23%) had close
relatives living in other CIS member countries: in other words, approaching three-
quarters of our Ukrainian respondents had a close family association with at least
one of the other former Soviet republics. Similarly, about two-thirds of our
Ukrainian respondents had visited Russia, and 28% had visited Belarus; but just
4% had visited Hungary or the Czech Republic, let alone a Western capitalist
country. In Belarus, nearly as many (63%) had a close relative living in Russia or
another CIS member country, and the overwhelming majority had visited Russia
(81%) or Ukraine (67%), but just 5% and 8%, respectively, had visited Hungary or
the Czech Republic.
The Russian figures, in our 2008 survey, were very similar. More than a quarter
(27%) had ‘several’ relatives in other CIS member states; another 11% had a single
relative in another CIS member state. More than a quarter (28%) had visited Belarus;
more like a half (44%) had at some point visited Ukraine. And more than a fifth
(22%) had visited at least one of the Baltic republics. By contrast, no more than 6%
had ever visited Germany, East or West. Foreign relations reflected a comparable
pattern. For ordinary Russians in 2008, for instance, the United States was a much
more serious potential threat to their security (46%) than the EU member countries
or Russia’s Slavic neighbour, Ukraine (16% and 15%, respectively). The same was
true the other way round. Russians themselves, for instance, thought the United
States was somewhat or entirely hostile towards them (52%), but only 9% took the
same view of Belarusians or Kazakhs; and nearly 40% thought the ‘colour
revolutions’ in the other former Soviet republics had been mostly the result of
American intervention.
To test the nature of support for this alternative ‘Slavic’ orientation, we asked, first
of all, if respondents regretted the demise of the USSR—indeed, if they thought it
had been a ‘disaster’ (see Table 5 and Fig. 2). Support for the USSR was clearly
declining, and a plurality in both Belarus and Ukraine did not regret its demise at the
time of our 2006 surveys; nevertheless, support is still very substantial (it was a
plurality again in Ukraine in 2007), and it is consistently the majority view in Russia,
where President Putin has himself described the USSR’s demise as the ‘greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the century’ in his annual address to the federal
11Elena Korosteleva, Personal communication, 2008.
12Ministery of Statistics and Analysis of the Republic of Belarus, 2006, figures available at
http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/ftrade1.php (23 January 2008)
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Table 5. Regret the demise of the USSR, 2000–8
Belarus Ukraine Russia
2000 2004 2006 2000 2004 2006 2007 2004 2005 2008
Strongly agree 34 25 12 39 35 18 25 38 41 29
Somewhat agree 31 29 27 18 22 23 23 25 25 28
Somewhat disagree 16 20 29 17 19 26 18 20 19 23
Strongly disagree 11 14 21 19 17 23 22 11 11 10
Don’t know/
No answer 8 12 12 7 8 9 12 6 5 9
(Ns) 1090 1599 1000 1590 2000 1600 1200 2000 2000 2000
Source: as Table 1. The wording of the question was ‘It’s a disaster [bol’shaya beda] that the USSR no
longer exists’, and respondents were invited to agree or disagree; the table shows rounded percentages.
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Belarus
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20
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24
Figure 2. Soviet nostalgia, 2000–8
Note: figures show the percentage of respondents who regret the demise of the USSR minus the
percentage who indicate that they do not regret it.
Source: derived from Table 6.
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parliament to 2005.13 For Russians, ‘the USSR’ is in effect the Soviet system, with
its positive as well as negative features. For Belarusians and Ukrainians, however,
the era of the USSR was also a time in which their countries had been union
republics and not independent states, in spite of their representation in the United
Nations. To regret the demise of the USSR was in effect to regret the end of a period
in which they had been ruled from Moscow, not by their own elected institutions; not
to regret its demise was to affirm their national sovereignty, without necessarily
rejecting the economic and political system that had prevailed at the same time.
There was less disagreement about the extent to which the post-Soviet republics
should associate more closely, particularly within the Commonwealth of
Independent States (Table 6). There was less support in Belarus and Ukraine than in
Russia for the reconstitution of a unitary state, in effect a post-Soviet USSR; support
for a unitary state was falling in each of the three countries, and support for the status
quo was generally increasing. Even so, more than two-thirds in Belarus and Ukraine,
and almost two-thirds in Russia, thought the former Soviet republics should at least
cooperate more closely. There was almost no support, across the three countries, for
the proposition that the CIS member countries should associate less closely than in
the past, or that the organisation itself should be dissolved. Predictably, there was a
close association between Soviet nostalgia and the belief that the former Soviet
republics should integrate more closely: those who most regretted the demise of the
USSR were more than twice as likely to believe that the former Soviet republics
should reunite into a single state, and vice versa. But the clearest finding is the
overwhelming level of public support across all three countries for a closer
association, and, particularly in Russia, the substantial support that still exists for a
reconstituted unitary state.
EAST OR WEST, BOTH OR NEITHER?
We have no wish to exaggerate the extent to which voting publics determine foreign-
policy choices, or the extent to which foreign policy considerations shape the choices
of electors. In previous work, we have suggested that domestic publics may place
‘outer limits on the foreign policies their governments have been able to pursue, even
if issues of this kind have not figured prominently in recent elections’.14 In each of
13Rossiiskaya gazeta, 26 April 2005, 3.
14Stephen White, Ian McAllister, Margot Light and John Löwenhardt, ‘Enlargement and the new
outsiders’, Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (1) (March, 2002), 135–53: 198.
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Table 6. The Commonwealth of Independent States, 2004–8
Belarus Ukraine Russia
2004 2006 2004 2006 2007 2005 2008
CIS should unite into
a single state 25 17 27 16 18 39 28
Should cooperate
more closely 52 52 54 55 53 38 36
Cooperation should
remain the same 8 19 7 15 14 10 16
Should cooperate less 1 1 3 2 3 2 2
CIS should be dissolved 5 2 3 3 5 4 4
Don’t know/No answer 10 9 7 10 8 9 14
(Ns) 1599 1000 2000 1600 1200 2000 2000
Source: as Table 1.
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the countries we have considered in the present study there is substantial support for
both a ‘Western’ and a ‘Slavic choice’, and each of these rival orientations has its
origins in social characteristics, such as language, religion, education and income
levels. More important, they are associated—particularly in Ukraine—with
distinctive patterns of political mobilisation. A ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy
incorporates both a Western and a Slavic orientation, and accommodates the rival
constituencies that provide politicians with their electoral support. The greater these
differences, and the more they relate to distinct domestic constituencies, the more
difficult it will be for the governments of the region to abandon this dual orientation
and commit themselves in one direction rather than the other; the greater the
consensus, the less the political cost of doing so.
Earlier work, including our own, has concentrated on a ‘European choice’ and
sought to measure it by the level of support that exists for a hypothetical membership
of the European Union.15 In this paper we have explored a broader ‘Western’
orientation, combining attitudes towards EU membership with support or otherwise
for NATO, and in this way tapping attitudes towards Western alliance systems as a
whole, and not simply those that are geographically European. The two, as we have
seen, are closely related; not only this, but they are closely related in the policies of
the political actors of the region, particularly in Ukraine, where a ‘Euro-Atlantic
choice’ incorporates them both. Similarly, we have taken account in the previous
section of attitudes towards a closer association of the CIS member countries as well
as of the views that are held about the demise of the USSR. The two, of course, are
closely related,16 but the relations that should exist among the members of the CIS
are a matter of current controversy, which makes them a more directly comparable
‘choice’, whereas the widely shared view that the demise of the USSR is a matter
for regret has no obvious policy consequences.
Cross-tabulating those who take a ‘positive’, ‘negative’ or ‘neutral’ view of each
of these rival orientations produces a three-way table with nine ideal types, as set
out in Fig. 3. ‘Pessimists’, for instance, are opposed to either orientation (they are
hostile to the idea of EU and NATO membership, but also hostile towards the
closer integration of the CIS and not inclined to regret the passing of the USSR);
‘optimists’ are positive in every one of these respects. There are intermediate types
as well: a strongly ‘Western’ orientation combined with a negative attitude towards
a ‘Slavic choice’ yields a ‘strongly Western’ orientation; a strongly ‘Slavic’
orientation combined with a negative attitude towards EU and NATO membership
produces a ‘strongly Eastern’ orientation. There are also ‘ambivalents’, who are
neutral in both respects. The more domestic opinion is divided on these matters,
the more a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy is necessary to accommodate the two
15See for instance Julia Korosteleva and Stephen White, ‘ “Feeling European”: the view from
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine’, Contemporary Politics 12 (2) (June 2006), 193–205.
16In Belarus the correlation between support for EU membership and for NATO membership was r
= 0.42; in Ukraine r = 0.50; and in Russia r = 0.31. For demise of USSR and CIS integration the
correlations were in Belarus r = 0.43; in Ukraine r = 0.42 and Russia r = 0.31.
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Figure 3: The relationship between views of East and West
East orientation
West orientation Negative Neutral Positive
Negative Pessimists Anti-west Strongly east
Neutral Anti-east Ambivalent Moderate east
Positive Strongly west Moderate west Optimists
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extremes; the more it is indifferent or united, the fewer the constraints on
government action.
How, then, are these ideal types distributed across the three countries? As Table
7 indicates, an ‘Eastern’ orientation is much more widely supported than its
‘Western’ equivalent and accounts for about half of those who provided responses
in each of the three countries. This is what we might have expected, given the high
levels of support for a closer relationship among the CIS member countries and
substantial levels of regret about the demise of the USSR. Nevertheless, there were
some notable variations. In particular, Ukraine was the most sharply polarised, with
more who leaned towards the East but also more who leaned towards the West than
in either of the other two countries; and there were more who were ‘strongly East’
or ‘strongly West’ oriented. In Belarus and Russia, there were almost as many who
regretted the demise of the USSR and supported closer CIS integration as in Ukraine;
but they were less inclined to do so emphatically, and less inclined to combine this
with a simultaneous insistence on moving towards the EU and NATO.
As these patterns suggested, Ukraine was also the country in which there were the
fewest ‘ambivalents’, with a neutral attitude towards either orientation; and it had
the fewest ‘optimists’, with a favourable attitude towards both of them. In Belarus,
‘ambivalents’ were the most numerous group; in Russia, ‘optimists’ were the second
most numerous; but in Ukraine, it was the ‘strongly East’ who were the most
numerous of all. Accordingly, it was in Ukraine that public sympathies were most
obviously divided, and it was here that opinion most directly underpinned the ‘multi-
vector’ position that has normally been taken by its political leaders as they seek
‘strategic partnerships’ with their Eastern as well as Western neighbours. Opinion in
Belarus and Russia is less polarised; accordingly, it draws on less distinct political
communities; thus, it presents the fewest constraints to the conduct of official policy.
Belarusian policy, as it happens, has also been a ‘multi-vector’ policy, while Russian
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Table 7. The distribution of opinion types (percentages)
Belarus Ukraine Russia
Eastern orientation
Strongly east 14 27 11
Anti-west 11 13 4
Moderate east 20 12 32
[Total] [45] [52] [47]
Western orientation
Strongly west 6 7 2
Anti-east 6 4 3
Moderate west 9 14 12
[Total] [21] [25] [17]
Unaligned
Ambivalent 24 17 13
Pessimists 2 2 2
Optimists 8 4 21
[Total] [34] [23] [36]
Total 100 100 100
(N) (533) (1,024) (1,228)
Sources: as Table 1.
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policy has normally attached a clear priority to relations with the other former Soviet
republics; but both can make their choices without the need to take the same account
of ‘veto groups’ within their domestic political environment.
Russian foreign policy orientations have a number of distinctive features within
this context. Russia, of course, is hardly a ‘land in between’, unless this is understood
as a territory that extends across Europe and Asia; and these geopolitical differences
need to be kept in mind when comparing its foreign policy orientations with those
of Belarus and Ukraine. On our evidence, Russian foreign policy orientations are
most distinctive for their ‘moderation’. There is relatively more support for a Slavic
choice than in either of the other two countries, and particularly large numbers who
regret the demise of the USSR. The largest single group, however, are ‘moderate’
rather than more fundamentalist Easterners; the ‘moderate Eastern’ orientation they
support does not necessarily exclude EU or NATO membership, though both are
entirely hypothetical; and indeed (as we have seen) there are more ‘optimists’, who
favour both orientations at the same time, than in either of the other two countries.
CONCLUSION
The implications of these findings are perhaps the most significant for Ukraine, in
that it is in Ukraine that foreign policy orientations are the most sharply polarised,
the most closely associated with enduring cultural differences such as language and
religion and the most obviously affected by the views of the mass electorate,
particularly in relation to the possibility of NATO membership. The two orientations
found their most direct expression in the divided and contentious results of the
2004–6 elections, and what appeared to be the rival foreign policies that were being
promoted by president and prime minister, respectively, in the months that followed
the appointment of the Yanukovych government in August 2006. The importance of
public attitudes was underlined again in the commitment of the president and his
associates to a programme of ‘education’ that was designed to shift them in a NATO
direction,17 a matter that was of importance to NATO itself. Belarus, although
ostensibly more committed to a Slavic choice, would find it less difficult, on the
evidence of these findings, to establish a closer relationship with the Western nations
if those nations were disposed to allow its people and government to do so.
From a Russian perspective, our findings are more ‘encouraging’. As we have
seen, Russians are the most committed to a Slavic choice, the most likely to regret
the demise of the USSR and the most likely to support the establishment of a unitary
state that would include the other CIS member countries. On our own and other
evidence, their orientation towards the former Soviet republics is also much more
important to them than their orientation towards their European neighbours.18 There
is, accordingly, a close association between public attitudes and official policy,
which has strongly asserted the Russian position in ‘post-Soviet space’ and sought
to develop the Collective Security Treaty Organisation as a security framework
within which Russian interests can be securely protected. Nevertheless, public
attitudes are also open to a closer relationship with the EU and NATO, even
membership, and much more concerned about Islamic fundamentalism and
organised crime than the traditional threat that is represented by the Western powers
and their military or economic alliances. An orientation of this kind, we have
suggested, reflects the issues of identity and culture to which the constructivists have
17Interview, Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, September 2006.
18Richard Rose and Neil Munro, ‘Do Russians see their future in Europe or the CIS?’, Europe-Asia
Studies 60 (1) (January, 2008), 49–66.
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drawn attention; the more the political process in the three countries allows them to
be articulated, the more powerfully they will constrain the actions of their
governments.
APPENDIX
Our surveys were conducted by local agencies according to a specification
determined by the investigators and following international best practice. Interviews
were conducted face to face in respondents’ homes; samples were representative of
the population aged 18 and over, using a multistage proportional method with a
random route method of selecting households. Agencies conducted their own checks
on the completion of questionnaires and the logical consistency of the data. The
original data and supporting documentation are generally available for inspection
through the UK Data Archive.
In Belarus our 2000 survey was conducted by Novak under the direction of Andrei
Vardomatsky, and fielded between 13 and 27 April; there were 62 sampling points,
and 90 interviewers (n = 1090). Our 2004 survey was conducted under the auspices
of Russian Research between 27 March and 18 April (n = 1597); there were 288
sampling points, and 120 interviewers were employed. Our 2006 survey was
conducted on a similar basis by the Centre for Sociological and Political Research
of the Belarusian State University under the direction of David Rotman, between 5
and 19 June (n = 1000).
In Ukraine our 2000 survey was conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of
Sociology under the direction of Vladimir Paniotto and Valeriya Karuk, and fielded
between 18 February and 3 March (n = 1590); there were 110 primary sampling
units and 125 interviewers took part. Our 2004 survey was conducted under the
auspices of Russian Research between 23 March and 2 April (n = 2000); there were
259 sampling points, and 187 interviewers were employed. Our 2006 survey was
conducted by Russian Research between 24 April and 12 May (n = 1600); there were
131 primary sampling units and 55 interviewers. Our 2007 survey was conducted by
the Kyiv-based agency Socis between 17 November and 3 December (n = 1200);
there were 86 primary sampling units, and 102 interviewers were employed.
In Russia our 2000 survey was conducted by the All-Russian Centre for the Study
of Public Opinion, and was fielded between 19 and 29 January (n = 1940); there
were 107 primary sampling units in 38 of the 89 subjects of the federation, and 193
interviewers were employed. Our 2004 survey was conducted by Russian Research,
and was fielded between 21 December 2003 and 16 January 2004 (n = 2000); there
were 97 sampling points and 150 interviewers. Our 2005 survey was conducted by
the same agency and fielded between 23 March and 20 April (n = 2000); there were
again 97 sampling points and 150 interviewers. Our 2008 survey was again
conducted by Russian Research and was fielded between 30 January and 27
February 2008 (n = 2000), and is representative of the over-18 population of the
Russian Federation.
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